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Q43Extant literature suggests that oil price shocks have a strong impact on themacroeconomy and the stockmarket.
However, relatively less is known about the effect of country-level determinants, competition, and asymmetrical
relationship in affecting the oil & gas stock return at the ﬁrm-level. Using a comprehensive ﬁrm-level monthly
data from 70 countries spanning 1983 to 2014, we ﬁnd: (i) macroeconomic stress negatively impact ﬁrm-level
returns; (ii) oil price shocks positively impact ﬁrm-level returns; (iii) ﬁrms located in high oil producing coun-
tries are more sensitive to global uncertainty and oil price shocks; (iv) ﬁrms located in non-competitive indus-
tries are less sensitive to oil price shocks; and (v) ﬁrms located in non-competitive industries are less affected
by the drop in oil price, as compared to ﬁrms that are located in highly competitive industries. Our results remain
qualitatively similar using a battery of robustness checks.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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To what extent are the systematic asset price risks of oil & gas ﬁrms
explained by the oil price shocks that are themselves affected by the
macroeconomic forces? Are monopoly ﬁrms less affected by the oil
price volatility? Does the stock market react symmetrically to the oil
price increase or decrease, especiallywhen the competition level within
the oil & gas industry is taken into consideration?We attempt to answer
these important issues in this paper.Weﬁnd that including ameasure of
macroeconomic stress can better explain the systematic asset price risk
of the oil & gas ﬁrms. The ﬁrms that are domiciled in high oil producing
countries or face strong competition fromotherﬁrms in the same indus-
try aremore sensitive to oil price shocks andmarket stress. Finally,ﬁrms
that are operating in non-competitive oil & gas industry are less affected
by the drop in oil price than ﬁrms that face strong competition from
other ﬁrms operating in the same industry.
The relationship between oil price and economic activity has been
extensively studied in the extant literature. The general consensus is
that oil price shocks can signiﬁcantly affect the economic activity of
the country. For example, Hamilton (1983) ﬁnds that oil price shocks
are responsible for majority of the US recession, post-World War II.
The ﬁndings are further tested and supported by Burbidge and. This is an open access article underHarrison (1984) and Gisser and Goodwin (1986). Recently, a number
of studies have extended the relationship between oil prices and eco-
nomic activity to the stock market. The evidence, however, is mixed.
For instance, Jones andKaul (1996) and Sadorsky (1999)ﬁnd a negative
relationship between oil price shocks and stock return, while Chen et al.
(1986) and Huang et al. (1996) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship be-
tween oil prices and the US stock return.
Sadorsky (2001) and Hamilton (2003) study the sources of oil price
shocksand indicate that theoilpricesmaythemselvesbeaffectedbythemac-
roeconomic forces. This suggests that oil price shocksmay not be exogenous
asmacroeconomic forces, such as political, economic andﬁnancial risks affect
systematic asset price risk. For instance, the underlying reason for the volatil-
ity in oil pricewas due to political (1990GulfWar), economic (1994Mexico;
1997 East Asia crisis; 2001 Argentina), or ﬁnancial reasons (1998 LTCM
Russia; 2008Mortgage-backed-securities US) [See Figs. 1 & 2]. Further,ﬁnan-
cial innovation in exotic securitieshas led tomore trading inoil futures, deriv-
atives, and other similar instruments. Therefore,market stress and disruption
can adversely affect trading of these instruments, leading to distortion of oil
prices (Wen et al., 2012).
A few papers addressed this issue by considering macroeconomic
factors in addition to oil price shocks. Sadorsky (2001) and Boyer and
Filion (2007) suggest that exchange rates and interest rates are impor-
tant risk factors. For instance, Sadorsky (2001) ﬁnd that an increase in
exchange rate decreases stock return. Boyer and Filion (2007) docu-
ment thatweakening of Canadiandollar against theUSdollar negativelythe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Fig. 1.Market Dislocation Index (MDI) and NYMEX Oil Price Index.
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Fig. 2. NYMEX Oil Price, Global Oil & Gas Industry Index and Global Market Index.
141K. Gupta / Energy Economics 57 (2016) 140–153affects the stock return. However, the exchange rate and the interest
rate prevalent in the local market may not fully capture the extent of
globalmarket stress or uncertainty. To this end,we use a bettermeasure
of macroeconomic stress — Market Dislocation Index (MDI) proposed
by Pasquariello (2014). Themarket dislocation is deﬁned as the stressful
conditions in which asset mispricing increases signiﬁcantly.
Pasquariello (2014, page 1870) note that, “MDI is a good candidate
proxy for the commonality in the many frictions affecting the ability
of global ﬁnancial markets to correctly price traded assets.”
Pasquariello (2014) notes that market dislocation measure is reason-
able proxy for a range of international, economic and ﬁnancial market
variables, such as NBER recession dummy, changes in Volatility Index
(VIX), world market return volatility, “TED”, and slope of yield curve
spread, among others. Further, this measure is superior in terms of
avoiding model misspeciﬁcation, as the model measures violations of
three well-known arbitrage parity conditions. Therefore, as MDI signif-
icantly relates to asset pricing, we argue that combining oil price shocks
and MDI can better explain the systematic asset price risk of oil & gas
ﬁrms. As seen in Fig. 1, this measure tracks important events of the
macroeconomy, such as the European currency crisis in 1992–1993,
the Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian default in 1998, the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC) of 2008–2009, the European debt crisis of 2009–2010, and
the Arab Spring in 2011–2012.2
The impact of oil price shock on ﬁrm-level stock return in the pres-
ence of product market competition requires further investigation. In-
creasing rates of mergers and acquisitions in the US oil companies
have resulted in consolidation and higher wholesale gasoline prices
(Oladunjoye, 2008). Consequently, a decrease in competitionmay result
in sticky gasoline prices and the ﬁrmsmay cushion themselves from oil
price shocks. For instance, Bacon (1991) observe “rockets and feathers”
occurrence, where ﬁrms increase the gasoline price rapidly following an
increase in the crude oil price but decrease the gasoline price slowly fol-
lowing a drop in crude oil prices. Similarly, Borenstein and Cameron
(1992) note that the asymmetry reaction of crude oil price changes to
gasoline prices may arise due to the market power of some producers
or distributors. Although the extant literature (see Deltas, 2008;
Oladunjoye, 2008 among others) study the effect of gasoline prices in
the presence of competition, a comprehensive analysis has been limited
to date. Most of the studies are restricted towards the gasoline prices at
the retail andwholesale level in the localmarket. Notmuch is known on
how the effect will be transmitted to the stock market under varying
level of competition.2 In unreported results, we check the statistical relationship between NYMEX oil return
andMDI.We undertake Vector autoregression (VAR) to account for a possibility of a two-
way relationship betweenMDI andNMEX oil price change. Using 2 lag-order selection, the
VAR results indicate that lag MDI negatively inﬂuences the NYMEX oil return. However,
the inﬂuence of lag NYMEX oil return on MDI is statistically not signiﬁcant.The role of country-level determinants in affecting ﬁrm-level oil &
gas stock return also requires attention. It can be argued that the perfor-
mance of oil & gasﬁrmsdepends on country-level determinants, such as
production and consumption of oil. For example, Russia, Venezuela,
Saudi Arabia and other oil-exporting countries generate a large share
of revenue from oil exports and therefore a drop in oil prices can have
a major impact on the overall economy. Lopez-Murphy and Villafuerte
(2010) ﬁnd that a small decrease in oil prices increases large demand
for ﬁnances in the near term for oil producing countries. Further, falling
oil priceswere some of the primary reasons for the RussianGovernment
to devaluate its currency and default on debt (Sadorsky, 2001). An in-
vestigation of how the stockmarket responds to oil price shocks, taking
into account country-level determinants, may provide further insights
on the importance of country-level determinants.
Previous studies frequently use oil & gas index as a benchmark to as-
sess the impact of oil prices on the stock market. However, it is well
known that the use of indices introduce a number of shortcomings
that can bias the results (Banz andBreen, 1986; Brown et al., 1992). Spe-
ciﬁcally, Brown et al. (1992) assert that including only surviving stocks
in a samplemay lead to artiﬁcial performance persistence and therefore
statistical tests may be unreliable. Further, by the measure of construc-
tion, oil & gas index composites do not capture well the performance of
distressed, dead, or delisted stocks. This is due to index construction ap-
proach where large and well-known oil & gas ﬁrms are given prefer-
ence. This may artiﬁcially inﬂate the oil & gas index returns, especially
during the period of market stress when the bankruptcy ﬁling rate
rises. For instance, the averagemonthly ﬁrm-level oil & gas stock return
is −0.56% with a standard deviation of 20.89%. In contrast, oil & gas
index average return and standard deviation is 0.64% and 8.09%, respec-
tively. In addition, ﬁrm-level determinants cannot be controlled if oil &
gas index is used as a performance benchmark. This leads to exclusion of
important ﬁrm-level determinants, such as leverage, expected cash
ﬂows, size, liquidity, and discount rate, from the estimation procedure
(Miller and Ratti, 2009). We address these shortcomings by using
ﬁrm-level data spanning over three decades.
Previous studies investigating the linkage between oil price shocks
and stock market mainly study industrialized economies. For instance,
Park and Ratti (2008) study the relationship between oil price shocks
and stock return in the US and 13 European countries. Papapetrou
(2001) studies the oil price shocks in Greece; Sadorsky (2001) and
Boyer and Filion (2007) investigate the Canadian market, and El-Sharif
et al. (2005) concentrate on the UK market. Recently, Ramos and
Veiga (2011) extend the analysis to 34 countries, covering developing
and developed countries. Although these studies contribute to the
existing literature by documenting intuitive ﬁndings, not much is
known on the impact of oil price shocks at the ﬁrm-level in developing
and transitional economies. By extending the analysis to 70 countries,
we provide evidence on the inﬂuence of oil price shocks andmacroeco-
nomic stress on ﬁrm-level oil & gas stock return at a global level.
3 See Pasquariello (2014) for detailed MDI construction procedure.
4 Forward rates prior to 1st May 1990 are unavailable.
5 We use DEM instead of EUR as one of the vehicle currencies prior to the introduction
of the Euro. Similarly, we use FRF and ITL as cross-rate currencies prior to the introduction
of the Euro.
6 http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/.
142 K. Gupta / Energy Economics 57 (2016) 140–153Our study contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways.
As pointed out by Huang et al. (1996), oil or oil by-products are one of
the main input factors that inﬂuence proﬁtability and expected cash
ﬂows of a ﬁrm. By using ﬁrm-level oil & gas data, we improve the ro-
bustness of the ﬁndings. Also, we study the systematic risk ofmacroeco-
nomic forces that are more likely to affect weak oil & gas ﬁrms,
especially in oil producing countries. Thus, the use of ﬁrm-level data,
covering developed, developing, and transitional countries over a long
period, addresses the bias associated with performance evaluation
using oil & gas index.
Second, to the best of our knowledge we are not aware of any other
paper that investigates the role of competition within the oil & gas in-
dustry in driving ﬁrm-level stock return. The results from this paper
may be of particular interest to policy makers and regulators as the re-
sults suggest that oil & gas ﬁrms operating in non-competitive oil &
gas industry are less sensitive to oil price shocks. Also, asymmetric
stock return is observed in response to oil price increase and decrease
for the ﬁrms operating in the non-competitive oil & gas industry.
Third, our study indicates that country-level determinants are im-
portant factors in explaining ﬁrm-level stock return. Particularly, we
show that the oil & gas ﬁrms located in oil-rich countries are more
sensitive to oil price shocks and market stress. Further empirical work
can explore other country-level determinants that are important in
explaining ﬁrm-level return.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The background liter-
ature is reviewed in Section 2. Data and methodology is presented in
Section 3. In Section 4, we present empirical results and their implica-
tions. Finally, Section 5 summarizes research ﬁndings and concludes.
2. Background literature
Prior evidence on the linkage between oil price shocks and ﬁnancial
markets come from (Huang et al., 1996; Jones and Kaul, 1996; Sadorsky,
1999). Particularly, Sadorsky (1999) shows the importance of oil prices
and their volatility in explaining real stock return. Huang et al. (1996)
report contradictory ﬁndings as the authors fail to ﬁnd any strong con-
nection between oil futures and aggregate-level market return.
Elyasiani et al. (2011) extend the analysis to 13 US indices and ﬁnd
that oil price shocks and oil return volatility constitute systematic
asset price risk for nine out of 13 industries. Kilian and Park (2009)
study the sources of oil price shocks and document that demand and
supply imbalance impact stock return differently. However, the authors
only consider the demand and supply imbalance but not other factors
that can lead to oil price shocks.
Studies have been also undertaken in the markets outside the US.
Using aggregate level Canadian oil & gas index, Sadorsky (2001) ﬁnds
a positive relationship between oil price and oil & gas stock prices;
while a negative relationship is observed between exchange rate, term
premium, and oil & gas stock prices. El-Sharif et al. (2005) extend the
analysis to the UKmarket and consistent with Sadorsky (2001), the au-
thors ﬁnd a positive relationship between oil price and oil & gas stock
prices. Boyer and Filion (2007) re-examine the determinants of oil &
gas stock return in the Canadian market by considering ﬁve common
and ﬁve fundamental factors. Using ﬁrm-level data, the authors show
how each of the common and fundamental factors affects oil & gas
stock return. The authors assert that increase in oil prices have a positive
effect on the oil & gas stock prices.
Nandha and Faff (2008) analyse the relationship between oil and
global industries. Using 35 Datastream global industry indices that rep-
resent the performance of each industry across countries (instead of
each country), the authors note that an increase in oil prices adversely
affects the stock return of all industries except mining, and oil & gas in-
dustries. Park and Ratti (2008) analyse the impact of oil price shocks on
real stock return in the US and 13 European countries between 1986
and 2005. The authors show that oil price shocks explain the variability
of real stock return in the same month or within a month. Ramos andVeiga (2011) extend the analysis to 34 markets and document that oil
prices are a globally priced factor for the oil industry. The authors also
document that the stock returns of oil & gas stocks respond asymmetri-
cally to oil price changes.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Market Dislocation Index (MDI)
We follow Pasquariello (2014) in constructing the market disloca-
tion index. The market dislocation measure is based on the law of one
price and derived from the deviation in the Covered Interest Rate Parity
(CIRP), Triangular Arbitrage Parity (TAP) and American Depositary Re-
ceipt Parity (ADRP). Since the approach does not depend on any
model, this signiﬁcantly reduces model misspeciﬁcation and as a result
increases the robustness of themeasure. MDI is available online but not
extended post-2009, therefore we reconstruct this measure as the
following.3
3.1.1. Covered Interest Rate Parity
As per CIRP lawof one price, the theoretical forward exchange rate of
borrowing in any currency A at the interest cost rA for T− t days, ex-
changing the borrowed amount to currency B at the spot exchange
rate St,A/B and depositing in currency B at interest rate rB is as the
following:
Ft;T;A=B ¼ St;A=B
1þ rA;t;T
1þ rB;t;T
 
Therefore, if the law of one price holds, the difference betweenmar-
ket forward exchange rate between currency A and B (Ft,T,A/B) and the
theoretical forward exchange rate (Ft ,T ,A/B⁎ ) should be close to zero.
In order to calculate daily CIRP violations, we use the same currency
suggested by Pasquariello (2014). We retrieve daily spot and forward
exchange rates of the ﬁvemost heavily traded foreign exchange curren-
cies from 1st May 1990 to 31st December 2014.4 These are CHF/USD,
GBP/USD, EUR/USD, JPY/USD, CHF/EUR, GBP/EUR, JPY/EUR, CHF/GBP
and JPY/GBP. We also retrieve corresponding LIBOR rates of each coun-
try for seven different maturities (7, 30, 60, 90, 180, 270, and 360 days).
Nine different exchange rates with seven different maturities result in
63 CIRP permutations. Both the exchange rates and LIBOR are available
from Datastream. Finally, for each permutation we compute absolute
log differences as, CIRPi ,t=|ln(Ft ,T ,A/B)− ln(Ft ,T ,A/B⁎ )|∗10,000.
3.1.2. Triangular Arbitrage Parity
The second arbitrage violation deals with price discrepancy among
three different currencies. This approach entails buying the vehicle
currency indirectly through other cross-rates currency. For example,
instead of buying USD/JPY directly, one can buy USD/GBP and
then exchange with GBP/JPY, resulting in USD/JPY. In the absence of ar-
bitrage opportunity, one will ﬁnd the difference between direct and
cross-currency exchange rate close to zero, i.e., St ,A/B−St ,A/B⁎ =0,
where St ,A/B⁎ =St ,A/V∗St ,V/B, V is the vehicle currency and, A and B are
the cross-rate currencies.
We retrieve daily spot exchange rates of the most liquid, relatively
free-ﬂoating currencies of AUD, CAD, CHF, FRF, GBP, ITL and JPY. We
use either USD or EUR as a vehicle currency.5 This dataset comes from
the Paciﬁc Exchange Rate Service.6 For each of the 112 TAP permuta-
tions, we compute daily absolute log differences between direct curren-
cy and cross-rates as, TAPi ,t=|ln(St ,A/B)− ln(St⁎,A/B)|∗10,000.
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The last set of arbitrage deviation relates to price discrepancy
between the stock listed in the local market and US-listed American
Depositary Receipt (ADR), taking into account bundling ratio and corre-
sponding date exchange rate. The theoretical ADR price derived from
the domestic listed stock is as the following:
Pi;t ¼ St;USD=H ∗qi ∗PHi;t
where St ,USD/H is the spot exchange rate between local currency and
USD, qi is the bundling ratio and Pi ,tH is the unit stock price of the under-
lying foreign shares in their local currency H. In the absence of trading
frictions, an arbitrage opportunity may exist if P≠Pi ,t⁎ . In order to ﬁnd
ADRP violations, we include 247 domestic–U.S. pairs of daily closing
stock prices from 40 countries that are listed as ADR in either NYSE,
NASDAQ or AMEX stock exchange. For each pair, we calculate ADRP vi-
olation as ADRPi ,t=|ln(Pi ,t)− ln(Pi ,t⁎ )|∗10,000.
The ﬁnal index construction entails a number of steps as underlined
by Pasquariello (2014). First, each parity is standardized relative to its
own historical distribution. Next, an equal-weighted average of all
three parities is computed on that day. In the last step, themonthlymar-
ket dislocation index is computed from daily data by taking the average
over the month. A high MDI suggests that market is under stress.
3.2. Stock price
The stock price data is from Datastream. We use International
Classiﬁcation Benchmark (ICB) to ﬁnd stocks that operate in the oil &
gas industry.7 This results in retrieving information of 2136 active and
dead/delisted stocks from 70 countries. Consistent with Nandha and
Faff (2008) and Park and Ratti (2008), we use monthly frequency
data. We use ﬁrm-level stock return to measure the sensitivity of
stock return towards oil price shocks and market uncertainty. The
monthly ﬁrm-level stock return is calculated as Ri,t = ln(Pt/Pt − 1),
where P is the price of stock i in month t. The stock price is adjusted
for theoretical growth in value of the dividend, assuming re-
investment. Thus, the stock prices reﬂect both capital gain and dividend
yield.
3.3. Control variables
In order to control the effect of other variables that are known to af-
fect the stock return, we use market return, illiquidity, standard devia-
tion of stock return, leverage, log of market value, percentage of
foreign sales, GDP growth rate, and price to book value ratio. We calcu-
late illiquidity as per the Lesmond et al. (1999) model, where a stock
with no change in price over a period of time is considered illiquid.
This measure is calculated as the ratio of zero trading days to the total
number of trading days over the last one year. As a priori, it is expected
that illiquidity and stock return have a positive relationship. Riskiness of
ﬁrm is computed as daily standard deviation of stock return over the last
one year. It is expected that a risky stock command a higher return. We
calculate leverage as long-term debt scaled by the total assets. Fama and
French (1992) document a negative relationship between ﬁrm size and
price to book value with stock return. Consequently, we use the log of
market value and price to book value ratio to control these factors. We
include Foreign sales % computed as foreign sales scaled by total sales.
This variable is included to take into consideration that oil & gas ﬁrms
may derive revenue from other countries in addition to domestic mar-
ket sales. GDP growth rate, retrieved from World Bank, proxies the
income level of the country. To improve the quality of the data, we7 In unreported results, we consider using industry classiﬁcation provided by FF48 clas-
siﬁcation (Fama and French, 1997), which in turn is drawn from the Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation (SIC). This does not alter our main ﬁndings.follow Ince and Porter (2006) and Chui et al. (2010) to address the
data issues noted in Datastream. The control variables and the stock re-
turn are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile to minimize the effect of
outliers.
3.4. Oil price and market return
Weuse New YorkMercantile Exchange (NYMEX) roll-on-future one
month oil price as a proxy for oil & gas prices. Our choice for NYMEX is
motivated by Elyasiani et al. (2011) where the authors suggest a num-
ber of advantages of using future oil prices over spot prices, including
less random temporary noise. Substituting NYMEX withWest Texas In-
termediate Cushing (WTI) or the UK Brent crude oil does not alter our
main ﬁndings. Following Sadorsky (2001) and Elyasiani et al. (2011)
we use risk-free rate adjusted stock and market return. The country-
speciﬁc market return and risk-free rate are retrieved from Datastream.
NYMEX prices are available from the US Energy Information Adminis-
tration (USEIA) website. The USEIA provides NYMEX prices, starting
29th April 1983, and therefore our sample period is from May 1983 to
December 2014.
3.5. Product market competition
We construct sales Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) as a proxy
for competition within the oil & gas industry in each country. This mea-
sure is extensively used in the extant literature, particularly in the in-
dustrial organization literature (see Tirole, 1988 among others). It is
calculated by squaring the market share of each ﬁrm in the industry
within the country and then adding the resulting numbers. The range
of HHI measure lies between zero and one, with a high HHI index sug-
gesting monopoly in the given industry. We calculate the sales HHI of
at least four ﬁrms in the industry out of a maximum number of ﬁrms
of 50. This is consistent with the US Census that uses the 50 largest
ﬁrms within each industry or the largest four-ﬁrm concentration ratio.
We also consider alternatives where the maximum number of ﬁrms
used in calculating sales HHI is not imposed or only the top four sales
ﬁrms within the oil & gas industry are considered. The results remain
qualitatively similar in either case. We use Worldscope database to ob-
tain sales ﬁgure of publicly listed oil & gas ﬁrms. The competition mea-
sure is calculated for the oil & gas industry in each country and each
year.
Table 1 reports for each sample country, the number of ﬁrm-month
and country-month observations used in the analysis. It also reports the
median oil production and consumption of each country, collected from
the USEIA website. A comprehensive 274,218 ﬁrm-month observations
from70 countries are used for empirical analysis. The sample has awide
coverage of ﬁrms located in developed, developing and transitional
economies, including major countries across all geographical regions.
We also note that, as expected, the sample is not evenly distributed
across countries. Canada and the US dominate the sample. However, ro-
bustness checks do not suggest the dominance of ﬁrms listed in Canada
and the US driving the main ﬁndings of this study.
In the fourth and ﬁfth columns, we report themedian oil supply and
consumption,measured in thousand barrels per day. As per USEIA,8 pro-
duction is deﬁned as, “The lifting of oil and gas to the surface and gath-
ering, treating, ﬁeld processing (as in the case of processing gas to
extract liquid hydrocarbons), and ﬁeld storage. The production function
shall normally be regarded as terminating at the outlet valve on the
lease or ﬁeld production storage tank. If unusual physical or operational
circumstances exist, it may be more appropriate to regard the produc-
tion function as terminating at the ﬁrst point at which oil, gas, or gas
liquids are delivered to a main pipeline, a common carrier, a reﬁnery,
or a marine terminal.” Consumption is deﬁned as, “consumption of8 https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/.
Table 1
Sample description.
No Country Firm-months Country-months Production Consumption
1 Argentina 962 322 802 542
2 Australia 22,966 380 588 989
3 Austria 323 323 27 262
4 Bangladesh 818 271 6 86
5 Belgium 160 160 11 550
6 Brazil 638 244 2284 2297
7 Bulgaria 135 135 3 99
8 Canada 119,856 380 2954 2065
9 Chile 305 305 18 249
10 China 1321 252 3809 6795
11 Colombia 299 242 690 277
12 Cote d'Ivoire 156 78 NA NA
13 Cyprus 306 167 0 56
14 Czech
Republic
426 236 10 179
15 Ecuador 196 196 398 140
16 Egypt 189 111 712 712
17 Finland 147 147 10 208
18 France 2280 380 97 1915
19 Germany 578 314 140 2533
20 Ghana 64 64 78 65
21 Greece 387 198 7 408
22 Hong Kong 248 166 0 354
23 Hungary 294 228 37 145
24 Iceland 63 63 NA 18
25 India 6986 299 818 2426
26 Indonesia 722 241 1042 1341
27 Ireland 2580 368 0 143
28 Israel 4199 263 4 242
29 Italy 630 228 155 1729
30 Japan 5974 379 104 5319
31 Jordan 178 102 0 108
32 Kazakhstan 157 68 1609 216
33 Kuwait 158 111 2692 431
34 Lithuania 112 112 10 57
35 Luxembourg 92 46 NA 59
36 Malaysia 1264 347 741 475
37 Mauritius 76 76 NA 22
38 Morocco 411 225 4 174
39 Netherlands 916 379 75 769
40 New Zealand 374 311 52 131
41 Nigeria 397 64 2459 287
42 Norway 1849 379 2385 221
43 Oman 109 109 819 114
44 Pakistan 2555 269 67 360
45 Papua New
Guinea
479 380 55 15
46 Peru 191 191 121 166
47 Philippines 2081 326 14 312
48 Poland 578 180 34 527
49 Portugal 98 98 5 274
50 Qatar 10 10 NA NA
51 Romania 631 197 117 220
52 Russia 5001 203 9732 2803
53 Saudi Arabia 193 110 11,429 2580
54 Singapore 1297 380 9 744
55 Slovak
Republic
90 90 10 79
56 Slovenia 191 191 0 54
57 South Africa 722 380 201 466
58 South Korea 2509 327 17 2155
59 Spain 599 333 29 1385
60 Sri Lanka 217 217 −1 81
61 Sweden 2420 306 7 350
62 Switzerland 316 208 4 266
63 Thailand 1822 334 310 1008
64 Turkey 1158 323 58 648
65 Ukraine 278 104 94 287
66 United Arab
Emirates
57 57 2947 586
67 United
Kingdom
15,107 380 90 1747
68 United States 54,355 380 9445 18,771
Table 1 (continued)
No Country Firm-months Country-months Production Consumption
69 Vietnam 777 96 340 432
70 Yugoslavia 185 68 21 80
Total 274,218
Table 1 reports for each sample country, the number of ﬁrm-month and country-month
observations used in the analysis. It also reports the median oil production and consump-
tion of each country, collected from the USEIA website.
144 K. Gupta / Energy Economics 57 (2016) 140–153petroleum products because it measures the disappearance of these
products from primary sources, i.e., reﬁneries, natural gas-processing
plants, blending plants, pipelines, and bulk terminals. In general,
product supplied of each product in any given period is computed as fol-
lows ﬁeld production, plus reﬁnery production, plus imports, plus
unaccounted-for crude oil (plus net receipts when calculated on a PAD
District basis) minus stock change, minus crude oil losses, minus reﬁn-
ery inputs, and minus exports.” Saudi Arabia, Russia and the US rank
high in oil supply, whereas the US, China and Japan rank high in oil con-
sumption. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia oil consumption is similar to
Germany even if the population and GDP are lower. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that increasing electricity demand and lack of alternative
sources of energy has led to high oil consumption in Saudi Arabia.9
We report summary statistics of sales HHI in Table 2. The overall
sales HHI in the oil & gas industry is 0.43, suggesting that the oil & gas
industry is relatively less competitive. Many countries, such as Austria,
Brazil, South Africa among others, have a high sales HHI ratio, indicating
that fewﬁrms dominate the oil & gas industry. On the contrary, oil & gas
ﬁrms domiciled in Canada and the US face strong competition from
other ﬁrms within the same industry. The standard deviation shows
variation of sales HHI across years. Although the standard deviation of
0.25 is not high, this indicates that competition within each country's
oil & gas industry is not sticky. In unreported results, we calculate aver-
age and median sales HHI across countries in each year from 1983 to
2013. We ﬁnd that sales HHI has increased marginally from 0.35 (year
1983) to 0.45 (year 2013).
We report summary statistics of control variables in Table 3.Weﬁnd
that the average ﬁrm-level monthly stock return is−0.56%with a stan-
dard deviation of 20.91%. Compared to stock return, average market re-
turn is 0.60% with a reasonable standard deviation of 5.20%. We also
document bias that may arise if oil & gas index returns are used instead
of ﬁrm-level stock return. In untabulated results, we calculate oil & gas
index return and ﬁnd average and median monthly return of multi-
country oil & gas index as 0.64% and 0.30% respectively. The standard
deviation of sub-index return is 8.09%, suggesting that sub-index
returns are positively skewed and less volatile than ﬁrm-level stock re-
turn. We also ﬁnd that out of a total of 2136 ﬁrms, only 552 were oper-
ating at the end of 2014. This indicates that close to 75% of the ﬁrms are
delisted due to various reasons. These observations suggest that theper-
formance of themajority of the ﬁrms may not be captured by an aggre-
gate level oil & gas index that mainly tracks the performance of large
and well-known ﬁrms.
As seen in Table 3, the illiquidity of oil & gas ﬁrms is 39.15%, suggest-
ing that on average the stock prices of ﬁrms did not change in four out of
10 days. Similarly, the average and median market valuation is 38 and
33 million USD respectively. It also seems that oil & gas ﬁrms have
lower level of leverage as the average and median leverage ratio is
12.80% and 5.01% respectively. Finally, the exposure to international
sales is relatively low as the average and median foreign sales percent-
age is 7.82% and 0% respectively. This suggests that a small number of oil
& gas ﬁrms generate substantial share of revenue from international
sales.9 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303816504577319571732227492.
Table 2
Summary statistics of sales HHI.
No Country Sales HHI No. of years
in sample
Mean Median St. dev
1 Argentina 0.51 0.52 0.10 21
2 Australia 0.35 0.34 0.06 20
3 Austria 0.95 0.95 0.01 9
4 Brazil 0.98 0.98 0.01 10
5 Canada 0.11 0.10 0.03 31
6 China 0.49 0.49 0.01 15
7 Cyprus 0.32 0.25 0.19 11
8 France 0.44 0.39 0.14 31
9 Germany 0.20 0.12 0.18 17
10 Ghana 0.50 0.50 0.00 4
11 Hong Kong 0.64 0.64 1
12 India 0.20 0.17 0.05 19
13 Indonesia 0.40 0.40 0.10 10
14 Ireland 0.89 0.89 0.05 20
15 Israel 0.51 0.47 0.08 10
16 Italy 0.67 0.65 0.07 18
17 Japan 0.17 0.16 0.02 31
18 Kazakhstan 0.71 0.71 0.03 3
19 Kuwait 0.77 0.76 0.03 9
20 Malaysia 0.25 0.23 0.11 23
21 Netherlands 0.60 0.37 0.31 22
22 New Zealand 0.73 0.80 0.13 3
23 Nigeria 0.31 0.31 0.01 4
24 Norway 0.56 0.56 0.11 27
25 Pakistan 0.35 0.31 0.13 21
26 Philippines 0.92 0.93 0.14 22
27 Poland 0.48 0.49 0.04 11
28 Romania 0.47 0.45 0.06 9
29 Russia 0.21 0.19 0.04 16
30 Singapore 0.27 0.25 0.09 23
31 South Africa 0.95 0.95 0.01 2
32 South Korea 0.41 0.36 0.14 17
33 Spain 0.56 0.53 0.09 14
34 Sweden 0.47 0.45 0.15 17
35 Switzerland 0.54 0.56 0.04 3
36 Thailand 0.44 0.40 0.11 14
37 Turkey 0.38 0.40 0.04 21
38 United Kingdom 0.42 0.31 0.19 31
39 United States 0.12 0.12 0.02 31
40 Vietnam 0.31 0.31 0.01 7
Overall 0.43 0.39 0.25
In this table we report summary statistics of sales HHI of the oil & gas industry within a
country. Number of years in the country indicates for how many years sales HHI of oil &
gas industry is available for the country.
Table 3
Summary statistics of main variables.
Variable Distribution
Mean St. dev 25th 50t
Stock return −0.56% 20.91% −8.85% 0
Market return 0.60% 5.20% −1.89% 1
MDI −0.09 0.19 −0.20 −0
NYMEXret 0.34% 9.31% −5.21% 0
St. dev of return 5.47% 4.94% 2.23% 3
Illiquidity 39.15% 30.02% 12.98% 30
Log of MV 3.65 3.06 1.31 3
PTBV 2.75 4.43 1.04 1
Leverage 12.80% 16.07% 0.00% 5
Risk-free 0.46% 0.22% 0.33% 0
Foreign sales % 7.82% 23.34% 0.00% 0
GDP growth rate 2.92% 2.41% 1.92% 2
In this tablewe report distribution ofmain variables. Stock return ismonthly log ﬁrm-level retu
is monthly log return of themarket inwhich the ﬁrm is located. MDI is based on the law of one
Arbitrage Parity (TAP) and American Depositary Receipt Parity (ADRP). NYMEXret is New York
daily standarddeviation of stock returns over the last one year. Illiquidity is calculated as per the
considered illiquid. Log of MV is logarithm of market value in US$. PTBV is price to book value
monthly rates retrieved from Datastream. Foreign sales % is percentage of foreign sales scale
GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.
145K. Gupta / Energy Economics 57 (2016) 140–153In Table 4, we report correlation matrices between dependent and
independent variables. The correlation between stock and market re-
turn is 0.217 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. As oil prices pos-
itively inﬂuence oil & gas stock return, we ﬁnd a correlation of 0.147
between ﬁrm-level stock return andNYMEX oil return. MDI is negative-
ly correlated with stock return, suggesting that an increase in global
market stress decreases the stock return of oil & gas ﬁrms. Firm size is
positively related to the stock return. We also do not ﬁnd the problem
of multi-collinearity as none of the correlations exceeds absolute 0.50.
4. Empirical results
Before undertaking further analysis, we verify whether the data suf-
fers from unit root problem. In Table 5, we present a modiﬁed Dickey–
Fuller t-test, proposed by Elliott et al. (1996) to check if the unit root
problem exists. The results indicate that the MDI index is stationary as
the DF-GLS tau-statistic is outside of the 1% critical value in all four
lags and therefore the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected. However,
oil price (NYMEX) tau-statistic is within the 1% critical value and there-
fore the series suffers from the unit root problem. Using the log differ-
ence (returns) of NYMEX, though, addresses the problem as the null
hypothesis of unit root is rejected at the 1% level. In unreported results,
we ﬁnd that unit root tests suggested by Phillips and Perron (1988)
and Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) indicate similar outcome. We also
ﬁnd (unreported) that other variables used in the analysis follow
I(0) processes.
In Table 6, we investigate the impact of oil price change and
market dislocation on oil & gas stock return by running the following
regression:
Ri; j;t ¼ ∝0 þ α1MDIt þ α2NYMEXreturnt þ∑α3Controlsþ α4 þ εi; j;t ð1Þ
where Ri,j,t is excess return ofﬁrm i, in country j, inmonth t over the risk-
free rate; α1 is the market dislocation index; α2 is the NYMEX roll-on-
future one month oil return; α3 is a set of control variables and α4 is a
set of ﬁrm-ﬁxed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant het-
erogeneity. For each country we retrieve country-speciﬁc Datastream
market index and use as an explanatory variable. We cluster standard
error at the ﬁrm-level to control for intragroup correlation within the
ﬁrm. The main coefﬁcients of interests are α1 and α2 with the expecta-
tion that α1 is negative and α2 is positive. Columns 3 and 4 include con-
trol variables, whereas Columns 1 and 2 do not.We use panel regression
with ﬁxed effect to infer the results.We undertakeHausman (1978) test
to check whether ﬁxed effect or random effect model is moreh 75th Skewness Kurtosis N
.00% 7.42% 0.09 7.95 274,218
.04% 3.56% −0.49 13.38 274,218
.10 −0.02 2.49 15.78 274,218
.92% 6.54% −0.34 4.95 274,218
.93% 7.11% 2.23 9.76 274,218
.53% 61.83% 0.62 2.13 274,218
.49 5.80 0.23 2.55 274,218
.69 2.74 6.27 53.59 165,695
.01% 22.71% 1.23 3.82 164,927
.44% 0.58% 0.71 4.47 274,218
.00% 0.00% 3.13 11.62 274,218
.80% 4.14% 0.00 8.45 274,218
rn, calculated as Ri,t=ln(Pt / Pt− 1), where P is the price of stock i inmonth t. Market return
price and derived from the deviation in the Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIRP), Triangular
Mercantile Exchange roll-on-future one month oil price. Riskiness of ﬁrm is computed as
Lesmond et al. (1999)model, where a stockwith no change inprice over a period of time is
and leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. Risk-free rate are country-speciﬁc
d by total sales. GDP growth rate, from World Bank, is annual percentage growth rate of
Table 4
Correlation coefﬁcient.
Stock return Market
return
MDI NYMEX
return
St. dev
of stock
return
Illiquidity Log of MV PTBV Leverage Risk free
rate
Foreign
sales %
GDP
growth
rate
Stock return 1
Market return 0.217⁎⁎⁎ 1
MDI −0.0919⁎⁎⁎ −0.238⁎⁎⁎ 1
NYMEX
return
0.147⁎⁎⁎ 0.207⁎⁎⁎ −0.230⁎⁎⁎ 1
St. dev of
stock return
−0.00137 −0.000876 0.0902⁎⁎⁎ 0.00388⁎ 1
Illiquidity −0.00634⁎⁎⁎ 0.00574⁎⁎ 0.0232⁎⁎⁎ 0.0168⁎⁎⁎ 0.293⁎⁎⁎ 1
Log of MV 0.0766⁎⁎⁎ 0.00561⁎⁎ −0.0788⁎⁎⁎ −0.00202 −0.553⁎⁎⁎ −0.665⁎⁎⁎ 1
PTBV 0.0541⁎⁎⁎ 0.0146⁎⁎⁎ −0.0294⁎⁎⁎ 0.0144⁎⁎⁎ 0.0414⁎⁎⁎ 0.0337⁎⁎⁎ −0.0290⁎⁎⁎ 1
Leverage 0.00912⁎⁎⁎ 0.0108⁎⁎⁎ −0.00470 −0.0193⁎⁎⁎ −0.210⁎⁎⁎ −0.299⁎⁎⁎ 0.336⁎⁎⁎ −0.0139⁎⁎⁎ 1
Risk-free 0.0105⁎⁎⁎ −0.00734⁎⁎⁎ 0.0789⁎⁎⁎ 0.00806⁎⁎⁎ 0.0423⁎⁎⁎ 0.0783⁎⁎⁎ −0.140⁎⁎⁎ −0.0273⁎⁎⁎ 0.111⁎⁎⁎ 1
Foreign
sales %
0.00407⁎ −0.0124⁎⁎⁎ −0.00587⁎⁎ 0.000950 −0.127⁎⁎⁎ −0.165⁎⁎⁎ 0.273⁎⁎⁎ −0.0439⁎⁎⁎ 0.0252⁎⁎⁎ −0.0676⁎⁎⁎ 1
GDP growth
rate
0.00471⁎ 0.0285⁎⁎⁎ −0.0380⁎⁎⁎ 0.0120⁎⁎⁎ −0.117⁎⁎⁎ −0.0343⁎⁎⁎ 0.0217⁎⁎⁎ 0.0169⁎⁎⁎ 0.0103⁎⁎⁎ 0.0839⁎⁎⁎ −0.0614⁎⁎⁎ 1
In this tablewe report correlation coefﬁcient betweenmain variables. Stock return ismonthly log ﬁrm-level return, calculated asRi,t=ln(Pt / Pt− 1), where P is the price of stock i inmonth
t. Market return is monthly log return of the market in which the ﬁrm is located. MDI is based on the law of one price and derived from the deviation in the Covered Interest Rate Parity
(CIRP), Triangular Arbitrage Parity (TAP) and AmericanDepositary Receipt Parity (ADRP). NYMEX is NewYorkMercantile Exchange roll-on-future onemonth oil price. Riskiness of ﬁrm is
computed as daily standard deviation of stock returns over the last one year. Illiquidity is calculated as per the Lesmond et al. (1999) model, where a stock with no change in price over a
period of time is considered illiquid. Log of MV is logarithm of market value in US$. PTBV is price to book value and leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. Risk-free rate are
country-speciﬁc monthly rates retrieved from Datastream. Foreign sales % is percentage of foreign sales scaled by total sales. GDP growth rate, fromWorld Bank, is annual percentage
growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.
⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
146 K. Gupta / Energy Economics 57 (2016) 140–153appropriate for this study. Under the null hypothesis, it is assumed that
random effect model is more appropriate. In unreported results, we re-
ject the null hypothesis as the value of (chi2) is 2859.35with a probabil-
ity of 0 %. Therefore, Hausman test suggest that ﬁxed effect model is
appropriate for this study.
The results in Column 1 suggest that the oil & gas ﬁrms are less risky
compared to overall market as the RM_RF coefﬁcient is 0.871 and statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This is consistent with Boyer and Filion
(2007) and Sadorsky (2001)where the authors note that oil & gas ﬁrms
are less risky but poor hedging alternatives. Including MDI as an addi-
tional explanatory variable in Column 2 yields a negative coefﬁcient of
−0.051, signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This is expected as an increase in
global uncertainty and stress leads to lower oil & gas stock return. This
suggests that oil & gas ﬁrms do not provide a good hedging tool when
the market uncertainty and stress is high.
In Column 3, we include NYMEX oil return and other control vari-
ables. The positive effect of oil prices on oil & gas ﬁrms can be seen as
the coefﬁcient is 0.223 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This
is expected as the rise of oil price increases the cash ﬂow and proﬁtabil-
ity of oil & gas ﬁrms. The MDI coefﬁcient remains negative and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The coefﬁcients of ﬁrm risk (standard
deviation of stock return) and illiquidity are positive, suggesting that
risky and illiquidity stocks require higher return.We ﬁnd a negative re-
lationship between foreign sales percentage and excess stock return,
suggesting that ﬁrms exposed to international revenue are likely toTable 5
Unit root test.
Lags MDI NYMEX Log dif NYMEX
DF-GLS tau
statistic
1%
critical
value
DF-GLS tau
statistic
1%
critical
value
DF-GLS tau
statistic
1%
critical
value
4 −5.687 −3.480 −2.562 −3.480 −7.984 −3.480
3 −6.168 −3.480 −2.635 −3.480 −8.344 −3.480
2 −6.232 −3.480 −2.569 −3.480 −9.100 −3.480
1 −6.353 −3.480 −2.451 −3.480 −11.741 −3.480
In this table we present amodiﬁedDickey–Fuller t-test, proposed by Elliott et al. (1996) to
check if the unit root problem exists.have lower stock return. GDP growth rate of the country positively af-
fects the oil & gas stock return. The GDP growth rate coefﬁcient is
0.0403 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
In Column 4, we consider an alternative measure of macroeconomic
stress, Kilian Index.10 Kilian Index is a measure of global real economic
activity from Kilian (2009) and available from Kilian's website through-
out the sample period. The Kilian Index coefﬁcient is positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, suggesting that an increase in real
economic activity positively affects the stock return of oil & gas ﬁrms.
In Column 5, we replace MDI with Volatility Implied Index (VIX) to in-
vestigatewhetherMDI is an appropriate proxy for global market uncer-
tainty. As VIX Index is only available post-1990, the number of
observations was from 274,218 to 252,375. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that
an increase in implied volatility, i.e. an increase in global uncertainty,
negatively affects the stock return of oil & gas ﬁrm. In Column 6, we in-
troduce additional control variables, PTBV and leverage. Although the
number of observations drops from 274,218 to 154,732, the results are
consistent with Column 3.11
The results are also economically signiﬁcant. For instance, when
global uncertainty rises from the bottom 25th percentile
(MDI=−0.20) to the top 25th percentile (−0.02), themonthly excess
stock return decreases by 0.28% (=0.0155 × (−0.02 + 0.20)) using
Column 3 estimates. Similarly, a change in oil price from the bottom
25th percentile (NYMEXret = −5.21%) to the top 25th percentile
(NYMEXret = 6.54%), increases the monthly excess stock return by
2.62% (=0.223 × (6.54 + 5.21)) using Column 3 estimates. Summing
up, the result suggests that both the market uncertainty and oil price
shocks are important determinants of ﬁrm-level oil & gas stock return.
In Table 7, we investigate whether the effect of MDI and NYMEX oil
return are felt evenly in high oil producing and net oil output countries.
It can be reasoned that the countries that rely overly onoil production as
a source of revenue are sensitive to oil prices and global market stress.
Therefore, a change in oil prices or international geopolitical events10 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.
11 As the sample size drops by less than half with the inclusion of PTBV and leverage fac-
tor, we do not include them in further analysis. The results, though, remain qualitatively
similar with their inclusion.
Table 6
Effect of market dislocation and oil price shocks on oil & gas prices.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excess stock return Excess stock return Excess stock return Excess stock return Excess stock return Excess stock return
Excess market return 0.871⁎⁎⁎ 0.826⁎⁎⁎ 0.762⁎⁎⁎ 0.773⁎⁎⁎ 0.738⁎⁎⁎ 0.849⁎⁎⁎
(55.75) (52.20) (49.53) (51.75) (45.03) (61.06)
MDI −0.0510⁎⁎⁎ −0.0155⁎⁎⁎ −0.0169⁎⁎⁎
(−20.40) (−6.25) (−6.13)
Kilian Index 0.0000524⁎⁎⁎
(2.90)
VIX Index −0.000439⁎⁎⁎
(−6.57)
NYMEX oil return 0.223⁎⁎⁎ 0.228⁎⁎⁎ 0.225⁎⁎⁎ 0.259⁎⁎⁎
(36.71) (37.56) (35.19) (34.30)
St. dev of Stk return 0.519⁎⁎⁎ 0.516⁎⁎⁎ 0.527⁎⁎⁎ 0.663⁎⁎⁎
(30.08) (30.23) (29.05) (18.44)
Illiquidity 0.135⁎⁎⁎ 0.135⁎⁎⁎ 0.148⁎⁎⁎ 0.137⁎⁎⁎
(28.41) (28.43) (29.55) (18.40)
Log of MV (~US$) 0.0282⁎⁎⁎ 0.0283⁎⁎⁎ 0.0298⁎⁎⁎ 0.0242⁎⁎⁎
(32.37) (31.97) (34.60) (20.82)
Foreign sales % −0.0248⁎⁎⁎ −0.0253⁎⁎⁎ −0.0221⁎⁎⁎ −0.0154⁎⁎⁎
(−7.17) (−7.34) (−6.24) (−4.09)
GDP growth rate 0.0403⁎⁎ 0.0483⁎⁎ 0.0186 0.0258⁎
(2.06) (2.45) (0.91) (1.09)
PTBV 0.00318⁎⁎⁎
(10.81)
Leverage −0.0407⁎⁎⁎
(−6.06)
Constant −0.0114⁎⁎⁎ −0.0159⁎⁎⁎ −0.197⁎⁎⁎ −0.196⁎⁎⁎ −0.198⁎⁎⁎ −0.199⁎⁎⁎
(−526.07) (−73.43) (−37.61) (−37.09) (−35.51) (−24.48)
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E.? Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level
N 274,218 274,218 274,218 274,218 252,375 154,732
Adj. R-sq 0.047 0.049 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.136
In this table we investigate the impact of NYMEX oil return andmarket dislocation on the oil & gas stock returns. The dependent variable is stock return less risk-free return (RI_RF), cal-
culated asRi,t− Rf.Risk-free adjustedmarket return (RM_RF) ismonthly log return of themarket inwhich theﬁrm is located less corresponding risk-free return.MDI is based on the law of
one price andderived from thedeviation in theCovered Interest Rate Parity (CIRP), Triangular Arbitrage Parity (TAP) andAmericanDepositary Receipt Parity (ADRP). Kilian Index is Global
Real Economic Activity Index fromKilian (2009). VIX Index is Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Implied Index. NYMEXret is NewYorkMercantile Exchange roll-on-future
onemonth oil price change. Riskiness of ﬁrm is computed as daily standard deviation of stock returns over the last one year. Illiquidity is calculated as per the Lesmond et al. (1999)model,
where a stockwith no change in price over a period of time is considered illiquid. Log ofMV is logarithmofmarket value inUS$. Foreign sales % is percentage of foreign sales scaled by total
sales. GDP growth rate, fromWorld Bank, is annual percentage growth rate of GDP atmarket prices based on constant local currency. PTBV is price to book value and leverage is long-term
debt divided by total assets. The model includes ﬁrm-ﬁxed effects. Standard error is clustered at the ﬁrm-level. t-Stats are given in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors.
⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
147K. Gupta / Energy Economics 57 (2016) 140–153can signiﬁcantly affect the cash ﬂow of the economy (Lopez-Murphy
and Villafuerte, 2010). In a similar vein, we argue that ﬁrm-level oil &
gas stock return in low oil producing countries are less sensitive to oil
price ﬂuctuations and global uncertainty as the economy of the country
is potentially diversiﬁed and not dependent on a single industry, such
as oil & gas. To this end, we split the sample into high and low oil
production/consumption countries. Each year we sort the countries on
the basis of production and consumption statistics available from
USEIA. We use the median oil production and consumption as a cut-
off measure to bifurcate the sample into low and high.
In Columns 1 and 2, we concentrate on oil production; while in Col-
umns 3 and 4, we concentrate on the net oil output, i.e. oil production
less consumption within the country. We ﬁnd that the MDI coefﬁcient
is−0.01 (t-stat− 2.74) for low oil producing countries compared to
−0.0341 (t-stat − 9.85) for high oil producing countries. Similarly,
NYMEX oil return coefﬁcient is 0.157 (t-stat 16.61) for low oil producing
countries, as compared to 0.227 (t-stat 30.65) for high oil producing
countries. Taken together, the results suggest that oil & gasﬁrms located
in high oil producing countries are more sensitive to global uncertainty
and oil price shocks. Similar results can be observed when we split the
sample based on net oil output at the country-level. The highMDI coef-
ﬁcient is almost three times larger than lowMDI, while the NYMEX re-
turn does not signiﬁcantly differ.
Economically, the results are meaningful. For instance, when the
MDI increases from the bottom 25th percentile to the top 25th percen-
tile, the monthly excess stock return of ﬁrms domiciled in low oilproducing countries decreases by 0.18%. Further, the monthly excess
stock return decreases by 0.61% for the ﬁrms domiciled in the high oil
producing countries. Similarly, a change of oil price from the bottom
25th percentile to the top 25th percentile results an increase of 1.84%
monthly excess stock returns for the ﬁrms domiciled in low oil produc-
ing countries. This monthly excess stock returns increases to 2.67% for
the ﬁrms domiciled in high oil producing countries. These estimates
are calculated using the same procedure as reported previously.
In this section, we examine the role of product market competition
in moderating the effect of oil price shocks and market uncertainty on
stock return.We form terciles based onwhether or not the ﬁrm is locat-
ed in the lowest HHI industry, the medium HHI industry or the highest
HHI oil & gas industry. Forming (2 × 1) and (4 × 1) vector of sales HHI
dummies to capture varying degrees of competition do not alter our
ﬁndings. In addition to control variables, the regression also includes
sales HHI dummies to control for the direct effect of competition on
ﬁrm-level stock return.
We report the results in Table 8. In Model 1, we introduce the inter-
action between NYMEX oil return and competition (sales HHI) tercile
dummies. The NYMEXreturn coefﬁcient in a high-competition oil &
gas industry, i.e., HHI (low) is 0.310 (t-stat 28.18); whereas
NYMEXreturn coefﬁcient in a low-competition oil & gas industry,
i.e., HHI (high) is 0.164 (t-stat 16.31). Further, we undertake Wald test
(unreported) to check whether the coefﬁcients are symmetric. The
null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level, suggesting that the oil & gas
ﬁrms operating in a non-competitive oil & gas industry are less likely
Table 7
Country-level production and consumption of oil.
Dependent
variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production Production–consumption
Low High Low High
Excess stock
return
Excess stock
return
Excess stock
return
Excess stock
return
Excess market return 0.814⁎⁎⁎ 0.716⁎⁎⁎ 0.807⁎⁎⁎ 0.707⁎⁎⁎
(37.51) (34.89) (43.79) (29.71)
MDI −0.0100⁎⁎⁎ −0.0341⁎⁎⁎ −0.0149⁎⁎⁎ −0.0348⁎⁎⁎
(−2.74) (−9.85) (−4.61) (−8.83)
NYMEX oil return 0.157⁎⁎⁎ 0.227⁎⁎⁎ 0.220⁎⁎⁎ 0.188⁎⁎⁎
(16.61) (30.65) (25.46) (23.52)
St. dev of stock return 0.543⁎⁎⁎ 0.549⁎⁎⁎ 0.504⁎⁎⁎ 0.568⁎⁎⁎
(11.20) (27.34) (12.32) (27.32)
Illiquidity 0.106⁎⁎⁎ 0.152⁎⁎⁎ 0.117⁎⁎⁎ 0.158⁎⁎⁎
(14.60) (24.20) (17.42) (23.08)
Log of MV (~US$) 0.0250⁎⁎⁎ 0.0312⁎⁎⁎ 0.0257⁎⁎⁎ 0.0324⁎⁎⁎
(19.13) (29.02) (22.90) (25.18)
Foreign sales % −0.0170⁎⁎⁎ −0.0402⁎⁎⁎ −0.0136⁎⁎⁎ −0.0495⁎⁎⁎
(−4.49) (−5.04) (−3.69) (−6.34)
GDP growth rate −0.0569⁎⁎ 0.149⁎⁎⁎ −0.0252 0.141⁎⁎⁎
(−2.57) (4.71) (−1.07) (4.25)
Constant −0.176⁎⁎⁎ −0.213⁎⁎⁎ −0.184⁎⁎⁎ −0.216⁎⁎⁎
(−20.61) (−33.24) (−23.96) (−31.01)
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E.? Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level
N 89,695 172,538 123,262 138,971⁎
Adj. R-sq 0.114 0.071 0.114 0.067
In this tablewe investigate whether the effect of MDI and NYNEX oil return are felt evenly
in high oil producing and net oil output countries. We use the median oil production and
consumption statistics available from USEIA as a cut-off measure. The dependent variable
is stock return less risk-free return (RI_RF), calculated as Ri,t− Rf. Risk-free adjusted mar-
ket return (RM_RF) is monthly log return of the market in which the ﬁrm is located less
corresponding risk-free return. MDI is based on the law of one price and derived from
the deviation in the Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIRP), Triangular Arbitrage Parity
(TAP) and American Depositary Receipt Parity (ADRP). NYMEXret is NewYorkMercantile
Exchange roll-on-future onemonth oil price change. Riskiness ofﬁrm is computed as daily
standarddeviation of stock returns over the last one year. Illiquidity is calculated as per the
Lesmond et al. (1999) model, where a stock with no change in price over a period of time
is considered illiquid. Log ofMV is logarithmofmarket value in US$. Foreign sales % is per-
centage of foreign sales scaled by total sales. GDP growth rate, fromWorld Bank, is annual
percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. The
model includes ﬁrm-ﬁxed effects. Standard error is clustered at the ﬁrm-level. t-Stats are
given in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors.
⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 8
Effect of competition on oil & gas stock prices.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Excess stock
return
Excess stock
return
Excess stock
return
Excess market return 0.738⁎⁎⁎ 0.751⁎⁎⁎ 0.739⁎⁎⁎
(47.15) (48.19) (47.12)
HHI (low) × NYMEXret 0.310⁎⁎⁎ 0.299⁎⁎⁎
(28.18) (26.85)
HHI (medium) × NYMEXret 0.178⁎⁎⁎ 0.179⁎⁎⁎
(18.05) (18.01)
HHI (high) × NYMEXret 0.164⁎⁎⁎ 0.172⁎⁎⁎
(16.31) (17.21)
HHI (low) × MDI −0.0461⁎⁎⁎ −0.0324⁎⁎⁎
(−11.14) (−7.83)
HHI (medium) × MDI −0.0180⁎⁎⁎ −0.0192⁎⁎⁎
(−3.00) (−3.18)
HHI (high) × MDI −0.00435 −0.0107⁎⁎⁎
(−1.14) (−2.91)
MDI −0.0218⁎⁎⁎
(−8.32)
NYMEXret 0.209⁎⁎⁎
(33.70)
St. dev of ret 0.529⁎⁎⁎ 0.530⁎⁎⁎ 0.530⁎⁎⁎
(28.63) (28.52) (28.60)
Illiquidity 0.149⁎⁎⁎ 0.149⁎⁎⁎ 0.149⁎⁎⁎
(27.05) (27.01) (27.00)
Log of MV 0.0317⁎⁎⁎ 0.0316⁎⁎⁎ 0.0317⁎⁎⁎
(32.17) (32.09) (32.14)
Foreign sales % −0.0248⁎⁎⁎ −0.0253⁎⁎⁎ −0.0250⁎⁎⁎
(−6.28) (−6.41) (−6.34)
GDP growth rate 0.00555 −0.00995⁎⁎ 0.00282⁎
(0.24) (−0.44) (0.12)
HHI (medium) dummy 0.0255⁎⁎⁎ 0.0268⁎⁎⁎ 0.0264⁎⁎⁎
(12.97) (13.38) (13.11)
HHI (high) dummy 0.0235⁎⁎⁎ 0.0250⁎⁎⁎ 0.0250⁎⁎⁎
(6.93) (7.36) (7.33)
Constant −0.229⁎⁎⁎ −0.229⁎⁎⁎ −0.230⁎⁎⁎
(−35.52) (−35.59) (−35.60)
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard error? Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level
N 246,631 246,631 246,631
Adj. R-sq 0.081 0.081 0.081
In this table we examine the role of product market competition in moderating the effect
of oil price shocks and market disruptions on stock returns. The dependent variable is
stock return less risk-free return (RI_RF), calculated as Ri,t− Rf. Risk-free adjusted market
return (RM_RF) is monthly log return of the market in which the ﬁrm is located less cor-
responding risk-free return. MDI is based on the law of one price and derived from the de-
viation in the Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIRP), Triangular Arbitrage Parity (TAP) and
American Depositary Receipt Parity (ADRP). NYMEXret is New York Mercantile Exchange
roll-on-future one month oil price change. We form terciles on the basis of whether the
ﬁrm is located in the lowest HHI industry, themediumHHI industry or the highest HHI in-
dustry. Riskiness of ﬁrm is computed as daily standard deviation of stock returns over the
last one year. Illiquidity is calculated as per the Lesmond et al. (1999)model, where a stock
with no change in price over a period of time is considered illiquid. Log ofMV is logarithm
of market value in US$. Foreign sales % is percentage of foreign sales scaled by total sales.
GDP growth rate, from World Bank, is annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market
prices based on constant local currency. The model includes ﬁrm-ﬁxed effects. Standard
error is clustered at theﬁrm-level. t-Stats are given in parentheses and are based on robust
standard errors.
⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
148 K. Gupta / Energy Economics 57 (2016) 140–153to be inﬂuenced by the changes in oil price. Thus, the stock return of oil
& gasﬁrms operating in non-competitive oil & gas industry are less like-
ly to be impacted by the oil price shocks.
InModel 2, we introduce the interaction betweenMDI and sales HHI
tercile dummies. The results are in line with Model 1, suggesting
that ﬁrms located in a non-competitive oil & gas industry are less
sensitive to global uncertainty and therefore the stock return are
less sensitive to global uncertainty. HHI (low) × MDI coefﬁcient is
−0.0461 (t-stat − 11.14), whereas HHI (high) × MDI coefﬁcient is
−0.00435 (t-stat − 1.14). In Model 3, we include the interaction
between NYMEX oil return, MDI and sales HHI tercile dummies. The re-
sults are consistent withModel 1 andModel 2.Wald tests (unreported)
also suggest that NYMEX oil return and MDI coefﬁcients are asymmet-
ric. In summary, the results suggest that ﬁrms that face less competition
from other ﬁrms in the oil & gas industry are less sensitive to oil price
shocks and market uncertainty. These results are in line with Sen
(2003), who study the retail gasoline prices in Canada. The author
ﬁnds international crude input prices and product market competition
(to a smaller extent) are important determinants in explaining retail
gasoline prices.
Previous literature (Hamilton and Herrera, 2004; Hooker, 1996;
Huang et al., 2005; Mork, 1989; Mory, 1993; Ramos and Veiga, 2011)suggest that the oil price shocks on economic activity are asymmetric.
An exception to this is Nandha and Faff (2008)who report contradictory
ﬁndings and show that symmetric relationship is observed between oil
prices and global industry indices. Nevertheless, there is little evidence
on the asymmetric relationship between the oil price and stock market
at the ﬁrm-level. In Table 9, we present evidence of an asymmetric rela-
tionship between oil prices and ﬁrm-level oil & gas stock return with
andwithout controlling for the competition levelwithin the oil & gas in-
dustry. We introduce two variables, an increase and decrease in oil
prices, to document the impact on stock return of oil & gas industry.
12 See Searle et al. (2009); McCulloch and Neuhaus (2001); Verbeke and Molenberghs
(2009); and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) for details.
Table 9
Asymmetric effect of oil price.
Dependent variable (1) (2)
Excess stock return Excess stock return
Excess market return 0.767⁎⁎⁎ 0.740⁎⁎⁎
(50.17) (47.21)
MDI −0.00410 −0.01000⁎⁎⁎
(−1.61) (−3.69)
Positive oil 0.131⁎⁎⁎
(13.01)
Negative oil 0.313⁎⁎⁎
(32.45)
HHI (low) × positive oil 0.133⁎⁎⁎
(6.62)
HHI (medium) × positive oil 0.129⁎⁎⁎
(7.97)
HHI (high) × positive oil 0.162⁎⁎⁎
(10.57)
HHI (low) × negative oil 0.467⁎⁎⁎
(24.08)
HHI (medium) × negative oil 0.231⁎⁎⁎
(15.98)
HHI (high) × negative oil 0.181⁎⁎⁎
(11.52)
St. dev of return 0.521⁎⁎⁎ 0.530⁎⁎⁎
(30.13) (28.58)
Illiquidity 0.135⁎⁎⁎ 0.150⁎⁎⁎
(28.36) (27.03)
Log of MV 0.0282⁎⁎⁎ 0.0318⁎⁎⁎
(32.45) (32.22)
Foreign sales % −0.0245⁎⁎⁎ −0.0249⁎⁎⁎
(−7.12) (−6.29)
GDP growth rate 0.0477⁎⁎ 0.00967⁎
(2.42) (0.42)
HHI (medium) dummy 0.0177⁎⁎⁎
(7.48)
HHI (high) dummy 0.0131⁎⁎⁎
(3.53)
Constant −0.190⁎⁎⁎ −0.218⁎⁎⁎
(−36.33) (−33.64)
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes
Clustered standard error? Firm-level Firm-level
N 274,218 246,631
Adj. R-sq 0.081 0.082
In this table we present evidence of an asymmetric relationship between oil prices and oil
& gas stock prices with and without controlling for competition level. The dependent var-
iable is stock return less risk-free return (RI_RF), calculated as Ri,t− Rf. Risk-free adjusted
market return (RM_RF) is monthly log return of the market in which the ﬁrm is located
less corresponding risk-free return. MDI is based on the law of one price and derived
from the deviation in the Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIRP), Triangular Arbitrage Parity
(TAP) and American Depositary Receipt Parity (ADRP). NYMEXret is NewYorkMercantile
Exchange roll-on-future one month oil price change. We form terciles on the basis of
whether the ﬁrm is located in the lowest HHI industry, the medium HHI industry or the
highest HHI industry. We introduce two variables, an increase and decrease in oil prices,
to document the impact on stock return. Riskiness of ﬁrm is computed as daily standard
deviation of stock returns over the last one year. Illiquidity is calculated as per the
Lesmond et al. (1999) model, where a stock with no change in price over a period of
time is considered illiquid. Log of MV is logarithm of market value in US$. Foreign sales
% is percentage of foreign sales scaled by total sales. GDP growth rate, fromWorld Bank,
is annual percentage growth rate of GDPatmarket prices based on constant local currency.
The model includes ﬁrm-ﬁxed effects. Standard error is clustered at the ﬁrm-level. t-Stats
are given in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors.
⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
149K. Gupta / Energy Economics 57 (2016) 140–153InModel 1, themain coefﬁcients of interests are Positive Oil (NYMEX
oil return × positive oil price dummy) and Negative Oil (NYMEX oil
return × negative oil price dummy). The results indicate that the sensi-
tivity of ﬁrm-level stock return to an increase in oil price is much lower
than a decrease in oil price. The Positive Oil and Negative Oil coefﬁcients
are 0.131 (t-stat 13.01) and 0.313 (t-stat 32.45) respectively. We under-
take a Wald test to check whether the coefﬁcient, Positive Oil and Neg-
ative Oil, are the same. The F-test value is 138.86 and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level, suggesting that coefﬁcients are asymmetric.Similarly, we test the hypothesis that coefﬁcients are jointly equal to
zero (Positive Oil = Negative Oil = 0).The null hypothesis is again
rejected (probability less than 1%), suggesting that the coefﬁcients are
not similar.
In Model 2, we introduce competition level within the oil & gas in-
dustry and document intuitive results. We ﬁnd that an increase in oil
price affect the ﬁrm-level stock return at a similar magnitude under
varying levels of competition. The HHI (low) × Positive Oil coefﬁcient
is 0.133 (t-stat 6.62), whereas HHI (high) × Positive Oil coefﬁcient is
0.162 (t-stat 10.57). However, a signiﬁcant difference is observed
whenwe compare a decrease in oil price for the oil & gasﬁrmsoperating
in the non-competitive industry compared to the ﬁrms that face strong
competition from other ﬁrms in the oil & gas industry. The HHI
(low) ∗ Negative Oil coefﬁcient is more than double the size of HHI
(high) ∗ Negative Oil and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, i.e.
0.467 (t-stat 24.08) and 0.181 (t-stat 11.52) respectively.
We undertake the Wald test to check whether the coefﬁcients are
the same or jointly equal to zero. We ﬁnd that the Wald test is unable
to reject the null hypothesis of [HHI (low) ∗ Positive Oil = HHI
(high) ∗ Positive Oil] at the 1% level (F-value 1.26, prob. 26.23%). On
the contrary, the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of similar coefﬁ-
cient [HHI (low) ∗ Negative Oil = HHI (high) ∗ Negative Oil] at the 1%
level (F-value 138.78, prob. b 1%). Taken together, the results suggest
that the ﬁrms that face less competition from other ﬁrms operating in
the oil & gas industry are unlikely to pass on the beneﬁt of oil price
drop. Stated alternatively, the stock return of ﬁrms operating in a low-
competition industry are less affected by the decrease in oil price
when compared toﬁrms that operate in highly-competitive oil & gas in-
dustry with the country. The results are in line with Ramos and Veiga
(2011), who suggests that some ﬁrms are less sensitive to oil price
changes and are able to pass the effect onto consumers. The results
are largely consistent with the “rockets and feathers” hypothesis of
Bacon (1991), where the author shows that the ﬁrms increase the gas-
oline price rapidly following an increase in the crude oil price but de-
crease the gasoline price slowly following a drop in crude oil prices.
Also Borenstein and Cameron (1992) note that the asymmetry reaction
of crude oil price changes to gasoline pricesmay arise due to themarket
power of some producers or distributors.
We undertake various robustness checks to reinforce the ﬁndings of
this study. In Column 1 of Table 10, we follow Sadorsky (2001) and use
Newey and West (1987) adjusted standard errors to account for serial
correlation and heteroscedasticity. The results are consistent with our
baseline regression results that are reported in Column 3 of Table 6.
MDI is negatively related to the ﬁrm-level stock return, whereas
NYMEX oil prices are positively related to the ﬁrm-level stock return.
In Column2,we use a longitudinal hierarchicalmodel that is increasing-
ly used when the data is nested in levels.12 This study uses ﬁrm-level
data with repeated observation across years and nested within a coun-
try. Accordingly, the data can be organized at two levels, i.e. at the ﬁrm
level and at the country-level. Time-series value of each ﬁrm can be
nested at the ﬁrm-level and further at the country-level. For example,
repeated monthly observations of British Petroleum are nested at the
ﬁrm-level, which can be further nested within the UK (country-level).
Thus, hierarchical modelling is supposedly superior in capturing inter-
dependencies at various levels. In addition, hierarchical model adjusts
for uneven distribution of sample within the nest and therefore uneven
sample distribution is not a major concern using this model. We let the
intercept vary at the country level and ﬁrm-level to capture interdepen-
dencies at various levels. We ﬁnd the results qualitatively similar to
previous results, as the MDI and NYMEXret coefﬁcients are statistically
signiﬁcant and in the expected direction. The MDI and NYMEXret
coefﬁcients are −0.0176 (t-stat − 8.28) and 0.226 (t-stat 52.72)
respectively.
13 We thank anonymous reviewers for suggesting these additional checks.
Table 10
Robustness checks.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Newey–West S.E.
adjusted
Hierarchical
model
Weighted
regression
Excluding Canada
and the US
Excluding countries with less
than 100 observations
Excess stock return Excess stock return Excess stock return Excess stock return Excess stock return
Excess Market return 0.761⁎⁎⁎ 0.762⁎⁎⁎ 0.818⁎⁎⁎ 0.735⁎⁎⁎ 0.762⁎⁎⁎
(87.77) (98.98) (52.53) (30.44) (49.48)
MDI −0.0197⁎⁎⁎ −0.0176⁎⁎⁎ −0.0212⁎⁎⁎ −0.00933⁎⁎⁎ −0.0157⁎⁎⁎
(−7.99) (−8.28) (−6.08) (−2.69) (−6.28)
NYMEX oil return 0.229⁎⁎⁎ 0.226⁎⁎⁎ 0.236⁎⁎⁎ 0.162⁎⁎⁎ 0.223⁎⁎⁎
(49.13) (52.72) (31.17) (17.41) (36.72)
St. dev of stock return 0.295⁎⁎⁎ 0.423⁎⁎⁎ 0.537⁎⁎⁎ 0.544⁎⁎⁎ 0.518⁎⁎⁎
(20.34) (40.28) (27.44) (12.96) (30.06)
Illiquidity 0.0577⁎⁎⁎ 0.101⁎⁎⁎ 0.159⁎⁎⁎ 0.102⁎⁎⁎ 0.135⁎⁎⁎
(31.56) (46.03) (24.93) (15.09) (28.39)
Log of MV (~US$) 0.0118⁎⁎⁎ 0.0198⁎⁎⁎ 0.0311⁎⁎⁎ 0.0243⁎⁎⁎ 0.0282⁎⁎⁎
(56.14) (67.51) (25.92) (20.10) (32.35)
Foreign sales % −0.0161⁎⁎⁎ −0.0184⁎⁎⁎ −0.0407⁎⁎⁎ −0.0164⁎⁎⁎ −0.0248⁎⁎⁎
(−10.77) (−8.33) (−6.23) (−4.80) (−7.15)
GDP growth rate 0.0287⁎ 0.0279 0.137⁎⁎⁎ −0.00553 0.0404⁎⁎
(1.84) (1.51) (3.84) (−0.26) (2.06)
Constant −0.0953⁎⁎⁎ −0.164⁎⁎⁎ −0.208⁎⁎⁎ −0.179⁎⁎⁎ −0.197⁎⁎⁎
(−48.04) (−37.58) (−31.66) (−22.23) (−37.60)
N 274,218 274,218 274,218 100,007 273,668
Adj. R-sq 0.070 0.105 0.081
In this table we undertake a battery of robustness checks. In Column 1, we follow Sadorsky (2001) and use Newey andWest (1987) adjusted standard errors to account for serial corre-
lation and heteroscedasticity. In Column 2, we use a longitudinal hierarchical model that is ideal when the data is nested in levels. In Column 3, we run weighted regression that accounts
for a number of observations associatedwith each country. In Column4,we exclude theﬁrms listed inCanada and theUS altogether from the regression. In Column5,we exclude countries
with less than 100ﬁrm-month observations. Thedependent variable is stock return less risk-free return (RI_RF), calculated as Ri,t− Rf. Risk-free adjustedmarket return (RM_RF) ismonth-
ly log return of themarket inwhich theﬁrm is located less corresponding risk-free return.MDI is based on the law of one price and derived from the deviation in the Covered Interest Rate
Parity (CIRP), Triangular Arbitrage Parity (TAP) and American Depositary Receipt Parity (ADRP). NYMEXret is New York Mercantile Exchange roll-on-future one month oil price change.
Riskiness of ﬁrm is computed as daily standard deviation of stock returns over the last one year. Illiquidity is calculated as per the Lesmond et al. (1999) model, where a stock with no
change in price over a period of time is considered illiquid. Log of MV is logarithm of market value in US$. Foreign sales % is percentage of foreign sales scaled by total sales. GDP growth
rate, fromWorld Bank, is annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Standard error is clustered at the ﬁrm-level. t-Stats are given in paren-
theses and are based on robust standard errors.
⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
150 K. Gupta / Energy Economics 57 (2016) 140–153An important concern that needs to be addressed is unequal sample
distribution. As seen in Table 1, the sample is dominated by Canadian
and US ﬁrms. Of the total 274,218 ﬁrm-month observations, Canadian
and the US ﬁrms dominate with 174,211 observations, i.e., 63.53% of
the full sample. Therefore, it may be the case that the oil & gas ﬁrms
domiciled in Canada and the US are driving the ﬁndings of this study.
To negate this concern, we run weighted regression that accounts for
a number of observations associatedwith each country.More speciﬁcal-
ly, following Costa et al. (2013), we use the square root of a number of
observations in a weighted multi-factor regression model to control
for uneven sample size across countries. The beneﬁt of using square
root of a number of observations is that standard error of the mean is
a function of the square root of n. In Column 3 of Table 10, we ﬁnd the
magnitude and sign of the MDI and NYMEX oil return coefﬁcients sim-
ilar to our baseline regressions. We also consider excluding the ﬁrms
listed in Canada and the US altogether from the regression, but our
major ﬁndings do not weaken, as reported in Column 4 of Table 10.
The MDI coefﬁcient is negative, whereas NYMEX oil return coefﬁcient
is positive. Both the coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level.
We also consider the possibility that the results are driven by coun-
tries with few ﬁrm-month observations. For instance, Table 1 indicates
that there are few countries with less than 100 ﬁrm-month observa-
tions, e.g. Ghana, Iceland, andQatar. Consequentlywe rerunour analysis
after excluding the countries that have fewer than 100 ﬁrm-month ob-
servations. The results, reported in Column 5 of Table 10, indicate qual-
itatively similar results as compared to our baseline results. The results
remain robust if we remove countries with fewer than 200 ﬁrm-month
observations (unreported).To further validate theﬁndings of this study,we undertake addition-
al robustness checks in Table 11.13 In Column 1 of Table 11 we investi-
gate whether the competition level within the oil & gas industry is
biased due to non-inclusion of private ﬁrms. As discussed previously,
the HHI Index is constructed using the sales data of publicly-listed
ﬁrms. However, state enterprises and other unlisted ﬁrms may prefer
to remain private and therefore sales HHI Index may not be capturing
the actual level of competition with the oil & gas industry. To address
this concern, we construct sales HHI Index that incorporates informa-
tion from thepublicly andprivately listed ﬁrms. The sales data of private
ﬁrms is retrieved from Bureau van Dijk's Orbis database. Orbis database
collects ﬁnancial information of private ﬁrms extensively across coun-
tries. Following Borell et al. (2010) we impose some ﬁlters to improve
quality of the data. Speciﬁcally, to limits the impact of “phantom”
ﬁrms, we restrict the sample to only those ﬁrms that have at least US$
100,000 in sales. Next, we merge the sales data of public and privately
listed ﬁrms and construct sales HHI index of oil & gas industry within
each country and each year. This results in retrieving information of
57,578 ﬁrm-year sales data of 15,297 public and private oil & gas ﬁrms
spanning 2004 to 2013.
The results reported in Column 1 of Table 11 suggest a similar pat-
tern. Following an increase in oil prices, ﬁrms operating in non-
competitive oil & gas industry (coefﬁcient of 0.244, t-stat 9.77) experi-
ence a higher stock return compared to ﬁrms that are operating in a
highly-competitive oil & gas industry (coefﬁcient of 0.0868, t-stat
3.01). Similarly, the stock return of ﬁrms operating in non-competitive
Table 11
Additional robustness checks.
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oil & gas Exploration & production Integrated oil & gas Oil & gas Oil & gas Oil & gas
Dependent variable — excess stock return (Local currency) (Local currency) (Local currency) (Local currency) (Local currency) (US$ equivalent)
Excess market return (local market) 0.885⁎⁎⁎ 0.758⁎⁎⁎ 0.773⁎⁎⁎
(42.62) (47.23) (18.58)
Excess market return (S&P 500) 0.559⁎⁎⁎ 0.734⁎⁎⁎
(48.38) (58.65)
Excess market return (DS world market) 0.621⁎⁎⁎
(54.16)
Private & public HHI (low) × positive oil 0.0868⁎⁎⁎
(3.01)
Private & Public HHI (mEd.) × positive oil 0.251⁎⁎⁎
(9.90)
Private & public HHI (high) × positive oil 0.244⁎⁎⁎
(9.77)
Private & public HHI (low) × negative oil 0.456⁎⁎⁎
(16.79)
Private & public HHI (mEd.) × negative oil 0.307⁎⁎⁎
(10.24)
Private & Public HHI (high) × negative oil 0.244⁎⁎⁎
(10.01)
Private & public HHI (medium) dummy 0.00810⁎⁎
(2.53)
Private & public HHI (high) dummy 0.0188⁎⁎⁎
(3.30)
NYMEX oil return 0.239⁎⁎⁎ 0.0813⁎⁎⁎ 0.269⁎⁎⁎ 0.234⁎⁎⁎ 0.350⁎⁎⁎
(37.28) (5.69) (44.55) (39.65) (53.88)
MDI 0.00659⁎ −0.0165⁎⁎⁎ 0.00346 −0.0254⁎⁎⁎ −0.0169⁎⁎⁎ −0.0211⁎⁎⁎
(1.82) (−6.15) (0.65) (−10.31) (−6.88) (−8.19)
St. dev of stock return 0.630⁎⁎⁎ 0.533⁎⁎⁎ 0.232⁎⁎ 0.525⁎⁎⁎ 0.522⁎⁎⁎ 0.530⁎⁎⁎
(18.13) (30.06) (2.22) (29.92) (29.99) (25.90)
Illiquidity 0.228⁎⁎⁎ 0.141⁎⁎⁎ 0.0486⁎⁎⁎ 0.135⁎⁎⁎ 0.134⁎⁎⁎ 0.149⁎⁎⁎
(22.97) (28.12) (4.49) (28.00) (27.90) (28.95)
Log of MV (~US$) 0.0451⁎⁎⁎ 0.0292⁎⁎⁎ 0.0156⁎⁎⁎ 0.0280⁎⁎⁎ 0.0281⁎⁎⁎ 0.0297⁎⁎⁎
(24.55) (31.43) (7.01) (32.11) (32.33) (34.05)
Foreign sales % −0.0133⁎⁎⁎ −0.0233⁎⁎⁎ −0.0287⁎⁎⁎ −0.0254⁎⁎⁎ −0.0258⁎⁎⁎ −0.0207⁎⁎⁎
(−2.87) (−6.28) (−4.67) (−7.19) (−7.39) (−5.99)
GDP growth rate 0.0358 0.0440⁎⁎ 0.0455 0.0598⁎⁎⁎ 0.0555⁎⁎⁎ 0.0721⁎⁎⁎
(1.15) (1.99) (1.13) (2.86) (2.67) (3.10)
Constant −0.323⁎⁎⁎ −0.199⁎⁎⁎ −0.122⁎⁎⁎ −0.198⁎⁎⁎ −0.196⁎⁎⁎ −0.213⁎⁎⁎
(−27.68) (−37.15) (−6.95) (−37.53) (−37.29) (−39.15)
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard error? Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level
N 115,601 246,462 27,756 274,218 274,218 247,578
Adj. R-sq 0.124 0.077 0.179 0.060 0.064 0.087
In this tableweundertake additional robustness checks. In Column1,we includeHHI index that is computed using both the sales data of publicly and privately listedﬁrms. In Column2, the
results are reported only for theOil & gas ﬁrms that are primarily engaged in “Exploration & production”. In Column3, the results are reported only for theOil & gas ﬁrms that are primarily
engaged in “Integrated oil & gas”. In Column 4, we use S&P 500 market excess return, while in Column 5, we use DSWorld market excess return. In Column 6, we convert the local ﬁrm-
level returns to equivalentUS stock returnsusing corresponding date exchange rate. Tomaintain consistency,weuseUS risk-free rate and S&P 500market index. Risk-free adjustedmarket
return (RM_RF) ismonthly log return of themarket inwhich the ﬁrm is located less corresponding risk-free return.MDI is based on the law of one price and derived from the deviation in
the Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIRP), Triangular Arbitrage Parity (TAP) and American Depositary Receipt Parity (ADRP). NYMEXret is New YorkMercantile Exchange roll-on-future one
month oil price change. Riskiness of ﬁrm is computed as daily standard deviation of stock returns over the last one year. Illiquidity is calculated as per the Lesmond et al. (1999) model,
where a stockwith no change in price over a period of time is considered illiquid. Log ofMV is logarithmofmarket value inUS$. Foreign sales % is percentage of foreign sales scaled by total
sales. GDP growth rate, fromWorld Bank, is annual percentage growth rate of GDP atmarket prices based on constant local currency. Standard error is clustered at theﬁrm-level. t-Stats are
given in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors.
⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
151K. Gupta / Energy Economics 57 (2016) 140–153oil & gas industry (coefﬁcient of 0.244, t-stat 10.01) experience less im-
pact following a decrease in oil prices as compared to ﬁrms that operate
in a highly-competitive oil & gas industry (coefﬁcient of 0.456, t-stat
16.79). Thus, the results are qualitatively similar to Column 2 of Table 9.
In Column 2 and Column 3 of Table 11we checkwhether the results
hold whenwe further divide the oil & gas ﬁrms into “Exploration & pro-
duction” and “Integrated oil & gas” respectively. Out of 2136 ﬁrms, we
note that 1936 ﬁrms are associated with “Exploration & production”,
whereas 200 ﬁrms are associated with “Integrated oil & gas”. We
ﬁnd the performance ofﬁrms that are primarily engaged in “Exploration
& production” are qualitatively similar to overall oil & gas ﬁrms. How-
ever, it seems that “Integrated oil & gas” ﬁrms are less affected by
oil price shocks and statistically not related to MDI. As seen in Column3, NYMEX oil return coefﬁcient is 0.0813 (t-stat 5.69) and MDI coefﬁ-
cient is 0.00346 (t-stat 0.65). This can be due to “Integrated oil & gas”
entities diversifying the risk by integrating downstream and upstream
operations.
In Column 4 and Column 5 of Table 11, we examine whether S&P
500 Index or Datastream (DS) World Market Index is a better bench-
mark for the overall market return instead of country-speciﬁc market
return. This step takes into consideration that market portfolio should
be independent of the country where the stock is traded. In Column 4,
we substitute local market return with S&P 500 return. In Column 5,
we substitute local market return with DS World return. To maintain
consistency, we use US risk free rate instead of local market risk free
rate in calculating excess return in Column 4 and Column 5. We ﬁnd
152 K. Gupta / Energy Economics 57 (2016) 140–153that the results remain qualitatively similar results as compared to our
baseline regression. As expected, the excess market return (either S&P
500 or DS World Market) coefﬁcients are smaller and are therefore
less sensitive in comparison to local market. NYMEX oil return is posi-
tive and statistically signiﬁcant, whereas MDI is negative and statistical-
ly signiﬁcant in Column 4 and Column 5.
The ﬁnal test pertains to the effect of foreign exchange on the stock
return. From the perspective of an international investor, an investment
made outside of the local market should reﬂect currency and country
risk. The investor is more interested in total returns that reﬂect ﬁrm-
level stock return and exchange rate return. Further, Sadorsky (2001)
and Boyer and Filion (2007) suggest USD/CAD exchange rates as impor-
tant macroeconomic determinants. Therefore, it may be intuitive to re-
port the results in one currency, such as US dollars, to maintain
uniformity and better interpretation of the results. To this end, we con-
vert the local stock prices into US dollar prices using equivalent day ex-
change rate. These exchange rates are retrieved from Paciﬁc Exchange
Rate Server. Next, we deduct US risk-free rate to compute excess stock
return. To maintain consistency, we use S&P 500 index as a benchmark
market. The results, reported in Column 6 of Table 11, suggest that ﬁrm-
level stock return is positively affected by changes in oil prices. Consis-
tent with prior results, the results indicate that an increase in global un-
certainty negatively impact ﬁrm-level stock return.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we propose that systematic asset price risk of oil & gas
ﬁrms are bettermodelled if both the oil price shocks andmacroeconom-
ic forces are taken into consideration. Further, the use of oil & gas index
as a performance benchmark of oil & gas ﬁrms may skew the returns
positively and mask volatility. This may lead to unreliable statistical
inferences. To this end,we use a bettermeasure ofmarket stress and un-
dertake a comprehensive analysis using ﬁrm-level data from 70 coun-
tries spanning three decades.
We ﬁnd that both oil price shocks and market stress have a strong
impact on ﬁrm-level stock return. The ﬁrm-level stock return is posi-
tively and negatively related to the oil price and market stress respec-
tively and therefore does not provide a good hedging tool. The results
are also economically signiﬁcant. For instance, when MDI rises from
the bottom 25th percentile to the top 25th percentile, the monthly ex-
cess stock return decreases by 0.28%. Similarly, a change in oil price
from the bottom 25th percentile to the top 25th percentile increases
the monthly excess stock return by 2.62%.
We also investigate the role of country-level determinants in
explaining the sensitivity of ﬁrm-level stock return towards oil price
and market stress. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms located in oil-rich countries are
more sensitive to oil price ﬂuctuation and market stress than ﬁrms lo-
cated in countries that produce less oil. The results are also economically
signiﬁcant. For instance, when the MDI increases from the bottom 25th
percentile to the top 25th percentile, themonthly excess stock return of
ﬁrms domiciled in low and high oil producing country decreases by
0.18% and 0.61% respectively. A change of oil price from the bottom
25th percentile to the top 25th percentile results in an increase of
1.84% and 2.67% monthly excess stock return for the ﬁrms domiciled
in low and high oil producing countries respectively.
Next, we investigate the role of productmarket competition inmod-
erating the effect of oil price shocks andmarket uncertainty on stock re-
turn. To determine the level of competition with the oil & gas industry,
we compute sales HHI Index of oil & gas industry within each country
and for each year. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms that face less competition are
less sensitive to oil price changes and market stress than those that
face strong competition from other ﬁrms operating in oil & gas industry.
The results suggest that the market power of the ﬁrms dampen the vol-
atility of theﬁrm-level stock return. Finally,we consider the asymmetric
effect of oil price on ﬁrm-level return.We ﬁnd that stock return of ﬁrms
operating in low-competition oil & gas industry is less affected by thedecrease in oil price when compared to ﬁrms that face strong competi-
tion from other ﬁrms. Our paper has strong policy implications. Regula-
tors and policy makers should consider industry competitiveness as an
important determinant while undertaking important decisions. Regula-
tors and policy makers should undertake steps to encourage competi-
tion within the industry to discourage dominating oil & gas ﬁrms from
gaining undue beneﬁts.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.04.019.
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